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A systematic review of the relationship
between rigidity/flexibility and
transdiagnostic cognitive and behavioral
processes that maintain psychopathology
Lydia Morris and Warren Mansell
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Abstract
An ever-growing number of transdiagnostic processes that maintain psychopathology across disorders
have been identified. However, such processes are not consistently associated with psychological distress
and symptoms. An understanding of what makes such processes pathological is required. One possibility
is that individual differences in rigidity in the implementation of these processes determine the degree of
psychopathology. The aim of this article is to examine the relationship between rigidity/flexibility and
transdiagnostic maintenance processes. Initial searches were made for research examining relationships
between 18 transdiagnostic processes and rigidity/flexibility. Relationships between rumination,
perfectionism, impulsivity and compulsivity, and rigidity/flexibility were systemically reviewed; 50
studies met inclusion criteria. The majority of studies indicated that transdiagnostic cognitive and
behavioral maintenance processes and rigidity were correlated, co-occurring, or predictive of each
other. Findings are consistent with the hypothesis that it is inflexibility in the manner in which
processes are employed that makes them pathologically problematic. However, further research is
required to test and establish this.
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Convergent evidence from genetic, neurophysiologi-
cal, personality, and cognitive–behavioral research
suggests that current diagnostic categories do not pre-
cisely specify the factors that cause and maintain psy-
chopathology (Buckholtz & Meyer-Lindenberg,
2012; Morris & Cuthbert, 2012; Ro¨ssler, 2013).
Numerous reviews have identified cognitive and
behavioral processes that maintain psychopathology
across disorders (Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, &
Shafran, 2004; Nolen-Hoeksema & Watkins, 2011).
These are termed transdiagnostic processes.
An important narrative review of the flexibility
literature (Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010) has made a
strong case that it is the ability to flexibly adapt
responses, in order to meet situational demands and
personal goals, which could be the key contribution
that flexibility makes to well-being. Yet, Kashdan and
Rottenberg’s review did not systematically review
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research relating to the relationship between rigidity/
flexibility and cognitive–behavioral processes.
Furthermore, the authors suggested that additional
work was necessary to integrate the different facets
of flexibility. To indicate the difference between the
studies reviewed in their review and the current
review, only seven studies were included in reference
list of both. Earlier reviews have also found it difficult
to integrate the facets of rigidity (Chown, 1959;
Schultz & Searleman, 2002). The current review
offers a theoretical account of how the constructs of
both rigidity and flexibility could be integrated. Our
review is further informed by reviews that indicate
that rigidity and flexibility are transdiagnostic pro-
cesses (e.g., Robinson et al., 2006; Snyder, Miyake,
& Hankin, 2015; van Holst, van den Brink, Veltman,
& Goudriaan, 2010).
Although considerable research evidence is avail-
able for whether a particular cognitive–behavioral
process is transdiagnostic or not, attempts to explain
how such processes relate to each other are much less
common. Further, there is increasing evidence that a
number of transdiagnostic processes are associated
with psychological distress only in certain contexts.
We propose that the feature of these processes that is
responsible for maintaining distress is the rigid or
inflexible way that they are applied. We introduce
perceptual control theory (PCT; Powers, 1973) as a
framework to explain how and why rigidity may
have this role. The first step in testing this proposal
is to review broad neuropsychological, clinical, and
personality research to establish whether measures
of transdiagnostic processes are related to measures
of rigidity and inflexibility. Showing correlations
between rigidity/flexibility and transdiagnostic pro-
cesses is a necessary but not sufficient step to estab-
lishing whether these processes, when applied
rigidly, lead to psychopathology. The current review
includes a number of studies examining correla-
tional, predictive, and interaction relationships,
using a variety of experimental paradigms and both
clinical and nonclinical participants. These diverse
methods of assessing rigidity and of transdiagnostic
processes make it unlikely that correlations are
purely based on circumstantial method variance of
individual measures.
To introduce the review, we define transdiagnostic
processes, rigidity, and flexibility. We then summar-
ize the evidence that transdiagnostic processes are not
consistently associated with psychological distress.
Finally, we introduce an explanatory PCT framework.
Figure 1 provides a diagrammatic overview of the
hypothesized model presented within this article.
The definition of a transdiagnostic
process
A cognitive or behavioral process is defined as “an
aspect of cognition (e.g. attention, memory,
thought, reasoning) or behavior (e.g. overt or subtle
avoidance) that may contribute to the maintenance
of a psychological disorder” (Harvey et al., 2004,
p. 14). It is recognized that the terminology of
“styles” could be used for some of the “processes”
reviewed; for example, “ruminative response style”
can be used to indicate the repetitive nature of this
process (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) and
perfectionism can be described as a style or a pro-
cess (Egan, Wade, & Shafran, 2011). However, the
term process is preferred in order to focus on prox-
imal and contextual factors that can affect a spe-
cific episode of any of the processes reviewed
(Roberts, Watkins, & Wills, 2013). A transdiag-
nostic process is defined as a cognitive or beha-
vioral process that contributes to the maintenance
of symptoms of psychological distress across a
wide range of psychological disorders.
The definition and measurement of
rigidity and flexibility
Conceptualizing rigidity and flexibility has proved
difficult (Chown, 1959; Kashdan & Rottenberg,
2010; Schultz & Searleman, 2002). We briefly review
some key ways in which these constructs have been
conceptualized. We then consider definitions based
on the extant literature.
Within the neuropsychological and neurobiologi-
cal literature, rigidity is often defined in terms of a
difficulty in switching from one set way of responding
to a different way of responding and can be synon-
ymous with set/task-switching difficulties. Flexible
cognitive control is comprised of a number of aspects
including “ . . . the inhibition of unwanted habitual or
impulsive responses” and “the rapid updating and
flexible switching of goals and behavioral dis-
positions . . . ” (Goschke, 2014, p. 44). Therefore,
flexibility encompasses both inhibiting inappropriate
goals and switching tasks to respond to changing
demands (Meiran, 2010; Miyake et al., 2000). Task-
switching and inhibition can be conceptualized as rel-
atively independent processes and some paradigms
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measure these specific components (Meiran, 2010;
Whitmer & Gotlib, 2012). However, commonly the-
oretical accounts emphasize that the functions of
switching and inhibition are highly interrelated
(Koch, Gade, Schuch, & Philipp, 2010), with empiri-
cal data supporting this (Friedman & Miyake, 2004).1
Therefore, it has been suggested that such executive
functions (EFs) exhibit both unity and diversity, that
is, different components correlate (suggestive of a
common underlying process) but also show separabil-
ity (diversity) (Miyake et al., 2000; Miyake & Fried-
man, 2012).
Factor-analytic methods have been used to extract
common and specific aspects of executive functioning
(Friedman et al., 2008; Miyake & Friedman, 2012).
Switching and inhibition are correlated at the latent
level, but this variance is accounted for a common EF
factor (Friedman et al., 2008). Further, at the latent
level, inhibition is fully accounted for the common EF
factor. The common factor is hypothesized to be the
ability to maintain task goals in working memory and
use them to direct behavior (Miyake & Friedman,
2012). Importantly, research indicates that common
EF and switching-specific components can show
opposing patterns of correlations (Altamirano,
Miyake, & Whitmer, 2010; Friedman, Miyake,
Robinson, & Hewitt, 2011) and, therefore, indicate
that switching and common EF should be considered
as separate (albeit interrelated) processes. Snyder
et al. (2015) provided a review of this area.
A key, comprehensive review included a meta-
analysis of three measures of rigidity and presented
a definition (Schultz & Searleman, 2002). Based on
this, and more recent conceptualizations of task sets
within neuropsychological literature (e.g., Meiran,
Kessler, & Adi-Japha, 2008; Miyake & Friedman,
2012), we define rigidity as “the tendency to develop
and perseverate in particular cognitive or behavioral
patterns, and such patterns being continuously
employed in situations where the pattern is no longer
effective.”2 For example, Rachel worries about her
performance at work and tries to do her best to get
her work perfect. She carries on perfecting work even
when it means she does not meet a deadline in time.
Rachel’s perfectionism enables her to produce work
of a high standard, but she persists in perfecting her
work even when this means that she does not meet a
deadline and, therefore, is no longer working
effectively.
A longstanding debate within rigidity literature is
whether rigidity is a dispositional trait or a task-
specific phenomenon observable under certain condi-
tions (Chown, 1959; Schultz & Searleman, 2002;
Stewin, 1983). In line with Schulz and Searleman
(2002), the definition given incorporates both dispo-
sitional and context-specific explanations of rigidity.
It is noted that for rigidity to be pathologically pro-
blematic, some degree of temporal stability is likely,
Example context: Attending a wedding, reminder that not in a committed 
relationship
Negative emotions as not meeting 
goal (can include sadness, anger,
depression, anxiety). For Darren 
sadness and depression were the
primary emotions.
Difficulties inhibiting and switching. 
Contribute to ‘rigidity’ (defined
within review). For example
Darren struggles to inhibit his
ruminative or switch his attention.
Inability to ‘switch’ from
transdiagnostic processes that have
been triggered by the combination 
of negative affect and ‘switching’
deficits a. Falls under the definition
of ‘rigidity’ provided. For Darren,
rumination and perfectionism were
the primary progresses triggered.
Inability to ‘switch’ from negative
emotions (not the focus of this
paper; see Hollenstein, 2015).
Darren’s persistent low mood 
maintains rumination and in turn 
the rumination makes him feel
lower.
Inflexible Control b
Continued activation of rumination, worry, perfectionism, etc. contributes to lack of
goal attainment (i.e. ongoing goal conflict); e.g. combination of rumination and 
perfectionism: revisiting of mistakes made during past relationships, leading to 
Darren not feeling confident to pursue a new relationship. 
Processes are rigidly applied (with greater repetition and for longer durations
than goal attainment requires) and result in psychopathology.
An example situation: Darren experienced an unpredicted ending to his romantic
relationship. Goal: to be in a committed relationship
Figure 1.Overall model presented within the article, using
an example. Notes. (1) Solid boxes indicate the relationships
that this article primarily focuses upon. Dashed boxes
provide overall context of the model. The example is ita-
licized. (2) For the purpose of simplicity, feedback and
bidirectional arrows are not used. But it is acknowledged
that there will be additional feedback relationships as
dynamic interactions involve constant feedback processes
(Powers, 1973); for example, continued perfectionist
rumination is likely to maintain negative affect (Di Schiena
et al., 2012; Randles et al., 2010). aIt is recognized that
inhibition deficits will also contribute to rigidity and inability
to disengage from transdiagnostic processes. But (as dis-
cussed in the “The definition and measurement of rigidity
and flexibility” section) it can be useful to separate these
two constructs and the current review focuses more on
switching. bThis construct is an aspect of arbitrary control
(described in the account of PCT in the review introduc-
tion) but specifically focuses on instances where continued
employment of a process prevents goal attainment and
maintains internal conflict. PCT ¼ perceptual control
theory.
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even if this is also task and context dependent
(Schultz & Searleman, 2002). For example, a parent
worrying about their child’s education might help
them clarify how best to support their child. However,
if they keep worrying about this when they have put
all the possible supports in place (a change in context
that means that this no longer meets their goals), then
this would be considered rigid. This is in line with a
review of the literature that indicated that expression
of a personality trait could vary as a function of con-
text (Ferguson, Heckman, & Corr, 2011; Mischel &
Shoda, 1995; Roberts, 2009), that is, even if rigidity
was “trait like” (i.e., temporally stable), it would not
manifest in all contexts. In a similar vein, it is also
proposed that an individual could display rigidity in
certain behavioral processes, but not in certain cogni-
tive processes. To return to the example given earlier
in this paragraph, of the parent worrying about their
child’s education, the parent might not persistently
and excessively worry about their own work or even
about their child’s social relationships. This will be
determined by the goals that are important to them;
for example, they might value education more highly
than their child having a lot of friends.
Following from the definition of rigidity given and
with reference to the review by Kashdan and Rotten-
burg (2010), flexibility is defined as “despite an indi-
vidual having formed a particular cognitive/
behavioral pattern of responding to a specific situa-
tion they are able to disengage from this initial pattern
if the initial pattern of responding is no longer effec-
tive for the specific situation.” For example, Mumtaz
has recently lost her mother and is experiencing a lot
of sadness. While she is at work, she suppresses
thoughts of her mother and appreciates being able to
focus on her work; however, when she speaks to
friends and attends a support group, she appreciates
being able to fully experience and express her sad-
ness. She is able to disengage from suppression of
sadness within situations where it is not effective.
Although not specifically emphasized in this defini-
tion, the authors propose that effectiveness of a given
pattern of responding for an individual in a specific
situation is determined by the individual’s goals
(Kashdan & Rottenburg, 2010).3 This is discussed in
more detail in the section introducing the PCT-
informed conceptual framework.
Throughout the review, the terms rigidity and flex-
ibility will be used. However, rigidity is considered
synonymous with inflexibility. One of the difficulties
in providing a consistent account of rigidity and
flexibility is that flexibility can be considered inter-
changeable with switching abilities within the neu-
ropsychological and neurobiological literature (e.g.,
Kehagia, Murray, & Robbins, 2010; Remijnse et al.,
2013). However, flexibility in the clinical literature
is often defined in terms of how effective a response
is, that is, whether it involves switching from pro-
cesses that are not in accordance with an individual’s
values/goals and can also encompass persisting with
processes that are consistent with individual’s goals.
For example, the term is used in this way within
acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT; Hayes,
Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999) and relational frame the-
ory (Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 2006),
some theoretical accounts of mindfulness (e.g., Sha-
piro, Carlson, Astin, & Freedman, 2006), and some
CBT accounts (e.g., Dennis & Vander Wal, 2010).
Although evidence suggests that effective switching
results in greater flexibility (e.g., Snyder et al.,
2015), there is a difference between the two concep-
tualizations described. This issue and a potential
solution will be outlined within our conceptual
account (the “An integrative PCT framework”
section).
What is the relationship between
rigidity and flexibility?
The authors’ conceptualization of rigidity and flexi-
bility is that these constructs are on the same dimen-
sion and are not conceptually distinct; consequently,
the definitions of rigidity and flexibility provided are
“mirror images” of each other. Furthermore, the def-
initions provided emphasize the ability to switch
when a pattern of responding is no longer effective.
This conceptualization that rigidity and flexibility
are opposite poles of a continuum is not new. Theor-
ists have suggested that the rigidity of thought and
behavior seen in many psychological disorders indi-
cates a lack of contextual sensitivity and flexibility
(Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010). Furthermore, in the
neuropsychological literature, flexibility and rigidity
are generally seen to relate in this way; for example,
flexibility is often measured by high ability to switch
tasks and rigidity is often measured as low switching
ability (Dennis & Vander Wal, 2010; Geurts, Corbett,
& Solomon, 2009).
However, some theorists have considered rigidity
to be a multidimensional construct rather than a uni-
dimensional construct, with flexibility at the other end
(Steinmetz, Loarer, & Houssemand, 2011) and a
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distinction can be made between “cognitive” and
“behavioral” rigidity (Schaie, Dutta, & Willis, 1991;
Schultz & Searleman, 2002). It is noted that multi-
dimensional conceptualizations of rigidity are com-
mon within the social and personality literature, but
not in the neuropsychological literature. For example,
Steinmetz et al. (2011) states
Presently, it is generally accepted that rigidity should
not be considered as a one-dimensional construct with
flexibility on the one extreme and rigidity on the other.
Rigidity is to be considered as multidimensional in
nature with perseverative behaviors in a multitude of
personal habits, cognitive sets, and attitudinal sets.
(Schultz & Searleman, 2002; also Schaie, Dutta, &
Willis, 1991, p. 86)
A recent study utilized a multitrait-multimethod
matrix and confirmatory factor analysis to investigate
the correlations between self and informant ratings of
rigidity and cognitive flexibility. Findings were of
medium to large negative correlations between rigid-
ity and cognitive flexibility measures (Steinmetz
et al., 2011). Due to the strength of the correlation
between latent factors of cognitive rigidity and flexi-
bility (r ¼ .46), the authors suggest that rigidity and
flexibility are not one-dimensional constructs (Stein-
metz et al., 2011). They further conclude that:
“Rigidity is not solely characterized by decreased
flexibility in an individual’s behaviors and views.
Rigid individuals show an important desire for
restructuring their environments into more manage-
able forms with the aim of reducing their cognitive
load” (p. 98). But it should be noted that a range of
self- and informant-report measures measured flexi-
bility and rigidity. This could contribute to lower cor-
relations due to the unusual breadth of the items
represented. For example, the Cognitive Flexibility
Scale (Martin & Rubin, 1995) was used to measure
cognitive flexibility. It includes items such as “I can
communicate an idea in many different ways”; mea-
sures of rigidity included the Rigidity of Attitudes
Regarding Personal Habits scale (Meresko et al.,
1954), which includes items such as “The only way
to make sure that things get done right is to set up a
definite and fixed schedule and never depart from it.”
Further, such measures could represent the converse
dimension on the continuum. For example, the item
described from the Rigidity of Attitudes Regarding
Personal Habits scale could be reverse scored to rep-
resent flexibility of attitudes, or even reworded to
represent such an attitude.
Further empirical work is required to clarify the
exact relationship of these constructs. However, it is
suggested that there is no conclusive evidence that
rigidity and flexibility are not on a continuum. Even
if rigidity is multidimensional, it is possible that each
dimension is on a continuum; this could entail a con-
tinuum of rigid to flexible behavior, rigid to flexible
cognitive control, and so on. Our theoretical rationale
for this conclusion is provided in more detail in the
section “An integrative PCT framework.”
Transdiagnostic processes are
inconsistently related to
psychological distress
To illustrate how transdiagnostic processes are estab-
lished, we provide a summary of research pertaining
to rumination and perfectionism, which are two of the
processes focused upon in this review.
Rumination was established as a transdiagnostic
maintenance process by Harvey et al. (2004), which
reviewed the extant evidence to establish whether
numerous cognitive and behavioral processes main-
tained psychopathology across Axis 1 disorders
(including anxiety, mood, eating, psychotic, and
substance-related disorders). Further reviews have
provided additional support that rumination maintains
psychopathology in all the disorder clusters afore-
mentioned (Ehring & Watkins, 2008; Nolen-
Hoeksema & Watkins, 2011; Watkins, 2015). In
addition, rumination predicts the onset of multiple
psychological disorders and symptoms, including
depression, anxiety, binge eating, and substance abuse
(see Watkins, 2015). Perfectionism was established as
a transdiagnostic maintenance process for anxiety,
mood, and eating disorders by a review in 2011
(Egan, Wade, et al., 2011); this review also indicated
that perfectionism prospectively predicts eating dis-
orders, depression, and bipolar disorder. More recent
research supports this and indicates that perfectionism
may predict anxiety symptoms (Mackinnon, Battista,
Sherry, & Stewart, 2014; Mandel, Dunkley, & Moroz,
2015), although findings are mixed as to whether the
relationship is prospective or concurrent (Gautreau,
Sherry, Mushquash, & Stewart, 2015; Sherry,
Richards, Sherry, & Stewart, 2014).
Table 1 provides a summary of transdiagnostic pro-
cesses and research establishing their transdiagnostic
status. (The research described within this table is
based on previous reviews and, therefore, is deter-
mined by the extant evidence at the time of these
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reviews; a systematic review of empirical studies
would be required to fully update the transdiagnostic
status of different processes.) However, there is con-
siderable evidence that transdiagnostic processes,
whether behavioral or cognitive in nature, are not
consistently associated with psychological distress.
We briefly review examples of these in turn.
Behavioral avoidance can refer to avoidance, or
premature leaving, of fear-evoking situations (Harvey
et al., 2004). Safety behaviors involve overt or covert
behaviors to avoid a feared outcome (Salkovskis,
1991). Although there is considerable evidence that
safety behaviors can maintain and exacerbate anxiety
(Helbig-Lang & Petermann, 2010), there is increasing
evidence that judicious4 use of safety behaviors does
not reduce the effectiveness of exposure therapy for
anxiety and, in some instances, actually improves it
(Deacon, Sy, Lickel, & Nelson, 2010; Hood, Antony,
Koerner, & Monson, 2010; Milosevic & Radomsky,
2008; Rachman, Radomsky, & Shafran, 2008; Rach-
man, Shafran, Radomsky, & Zysk, 2011). In a recent
review, it was suggested that a particular behavior can
be more or less functional within a given situation
(Helbig-Lang & Petermann, 2010); for example, pre-
paring for a presentation might be functional, yet
excessive preparation (commonly seen in social anxi-
ety disorders) can be counterproductive.
Covert behaviors seem to show a similar pattern of
findings. For example, emotional suppression is gen-
erally positively associated with psychopathology
(Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010). How-
ever, emotional suppression can also be adaptive,
such as choosing to suppress grief at work so that one
can achieve the tasks of the day. Indeed, research
shows that emotional suppression can predict reduced
distress over time (Bonanno, Papa, Lalande, West-
phal, & Coifman, 2004; Westphal, Seivert, &
Bonanno, 2010). In the same studies, effective emo-
tional expression, which is apparently opposite to
emotion suppression, also predicted reduced distress
(Bonanno et al., 2004; Westphal et al., 2010).
Further, a comprehensive review indicated that
worry is not consistently associated with psychologi-
cal distress (Watkins, 2008). Similarly, evidence from
different research groups suggests that ruminative
thinking has adaptive elements (Joormann, Dkane,
& Gotlib, 2006; Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2003). In order to explain these findings,
several authors have turned to accounts that refer to
rigidity; for example, Watkins & Nolen-Hoeksema
(2014) propose that one of the aspects that makes
rumination pathological is when it becomes habitual
and recognize that deficits in attentional control
(including inhibition) could result in difficulties in
interrupting habits. A seminal review of the role of
self-focused attention in psychopathology proposed
that it is the rigidity of self-focused attention that
maintains distress across disorders (Ingram, 1990).
More recently, it has been found that “mind
wandering” (attention shifting from an activity toward
unrelated inner thoughts and feelings) becomes mala-
daptive when it becomes a rigid pattern (Ottaviani,
Shapiro, & Couyoumdjian, 2013).
Personality style research indicates similar patterns
of findings and explanation. For example, perfection-
ism has been conceptualized as having both adaptive
and maladaptive aspects, with evidence to support this
distinction (Bergman, Nyland, & Burns, 2007; Biel-
ing, Israeli, & Antony, 2004; Owens & Slade, 2008).
However, attempts in clinical samples to differentiate
between adaptive and maladaptive perfectionism
have not fully supported a categorical distinction
(Egan, Piek, Dyck, & Kane, 2011). It has been pro-
posed that whether perfectionism is adaptive or could
not be determined by the degree of perfectionism and
whether this enables an individual to meet their goals
in a given situation (Haase, Prapavessis, & Owens,
2013; Hamachek, 1978; Shafran, Cooper, & Fairburn,
2002). For example, studies indicate that individuals
can experience both adaptive and maladaptive perfec-
tionism depending on the domain (e.g., adaptive per-
fectionism at work, maladaptive regarding physical
appearance) (Haase et al., 2013).
There are also more specific empirical findings to
indicate that it is the rigid way that processes are
applied that maintains distress. Several studies using
a range of methodologies have found that people who
use a mixture of different coping processes showed
less anxiety and depression than those who showed
rigid adherence to either problem or emotion-focused
processes (Cheng, 2001; Cheng, Hui, & Lam, 2000).
Furthermore, individual differences in flexibility of
process use are associated with, and predictive of,
adjustment in students exposed to trauma and/or stres-
sors (Galatzer-Levy, Burton, & Bonanno, 2012).
Even though certain transdiagnostic processes (such
as rumination and emotion suppression) are generally
associated with psychological distress compared to
“adaptive” processes (such as acceptance, reappraisal,
and problem-solving), it appears that there is another
important difference—the “maladaptive” processes
are applied with less variability (Aldao et al., 2010;
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Aldao & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012). This suggests that
it could be when these processes become more rigidly
“default” that they become pathological.
It is important to note that some processes—but not
all—are explicitly conceptualized in terms of rigidity
and, therefore, are more likely to promote psycho-
pathology. For example, intolerance of uncertainty
is defined as a “tendency to react negatively on an
emotional, cognitive, and behavioral level to uncer-
tain situations” (Buhr & Dugas, 2009, p. 216). While
uncertainty itself can be adaptive (Bar-Anan, Wilson,
& Gilbert, 2009; Einstein, 2014), this definition
emphasizes a negative reaction to the unpredictable
events that will inevitably arise. Consequently, intol-
erance of uncertainty and intolerance of ambiguity
have been conceptualized as aspects of rigidity (Fer-
gus & Rowatt, 2014; Schultz & Searleman, 2002).5 In
such cases, these processes seem likely to lead nega-
tive outcomes (i.e., psychopathology, elevated dis-
tress). Further, commonly self-report measures of
transdiagnostic processes include items that refer to
processes being employed repeatedly and excessively.
Our review examines whether defining transdiagnostic
processes “in terms of” rigidity is appropriate, espe-
cially given the less consistent relationship with psy-
chopathology in other domains (e.g., repetitive
thinking, perfectionism, emotional suppression).
Overall, the evidence indicates that it is when cer-
tain processes are utilized rigidly that they become
pathological. Yet, the studies reviewed above have
commonly not used established measures of processes
that can contribute to rigidity and flexibility (e.g.,
switching measures). Furthermore, it is necessary to
understand how and why such processes are some-
times pathological, for example, so that pathological
processes can be treated therapeutically.
An integrative PCT framework
It is important not merely to state that the rigid use of
certain processes can result in distress and psycho-
pathology, but to explain how and why this may be
the case. Furthermore, a closely specified theoretical
account can enable unique predictions. We use a self-
regulatory macro-theory,6 PCT, to provide such an
explanation.
Control is a key tenet of PCT. It is seen as a fun-
damental process and refers to keeping a perception as
close as possible to a desired goal (or internal refer-
ence; see Figure 2 for the closed “negative feedback”
loop that is the basic unit of control within PCT). A
full pathway round such as closed loop is necessary to
implement the control of perception by behavior. The
“reference” or goal refers to a broad range of “personal
just rights,” from reference values for a good cup of tea
(e.g., milky but strong) to reference values for being a
good person (e.g., kind, honest, etc.). It is beyond the
scope of this article to provide a detailed account of the
evidence base for PCT (see Mansell & Carey, 2009;
Marken & Mansell, 2013).
PCT suggests that these internal references are
organized hierarchically with higher levels specifying
the references for the levels below. Higher level refer-
ences refer to self-concept and other important refer-
ences, such as “I want to be a safe” and “I want to be
capable.” It is proposed that enduring higher level
conflicts between goals undermines control and is
associated with distress (Carey, Mansell, Tai, & Tur-
kington, 2014), and this is supported by a recent sys-
tematic review of the literature (Kelly, Mansell, &
Wood, 2015). For example, a person who has been
assaulted in their neighborhood may experience anxi-
ety and indecision about whether to leave the house
because they strive to be capable and safe from harm.
A PCT account offers a distinct explanation of
when and how particularly rigid forms of control
(including habits and psychological processes) lead
to distress, by maintaining the goal conflicts described
above (Mansell, 2012). Such control is termed arbi-
trary control (Mansell, 2005; Powers, 1973). Arbi-
trary control refers to “attempts to make behavior
conform to one set of goals without regard to other
goals (and control systems) that may already be con-
trolling that behavior” (Powers, 1973, p. 271). Figure
3(a) illustrates how conflict at higher levels of the
control system can lead to rigid employment of trans-
diagnostic processes. It is generally a conscious
choice to aim at a particular goal and sometimes this
will involve implementing a particular transdiagnos-
tic process, but it is unlikely that it is a volitional goal
“to be rigid” or impair other goals. For example, the
beginning of ruminative thinking can either arise
spontaneously or through conscious choice (Hertel,
2004; Watkins & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2014), as rumi-
nation can be perceived to facilitate understanding a
situation better or further goal pursuit in other ways
(e.g., Kingston, Watkins, & O’Mahen, 2013; Moberly
& Watkins, 2010; Watkins, 2004). For this thinking to
interfere with goal progress, and therefore to be rigid,
it will need to be continued; this can be a conscious or
more automatic process (Watkins & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2014). However, the extent to which an
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individual is able to “switch from” rumination if they
realize it is inconsistent with their goals will vary, as
switching and inhibition deficits and low mood can
contribute to difficulties disengaging (Koster, De
Lissnyder, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2011). So, in this
example, the person is not choosing to be rigid, rather
they are trying to reduce a behavior (rumination) that
is not in line with their goals but are unable to effec-
tively do so.
Arbitrary control is more likely to lead to goal
conflict and psychological distress, because if one
goal is pursued over another, then the second goal
will not be met (Brandtsta¨dter & Renner, 1990; Kelly,
Wood, & Mansell, 2012). For example, pursuing a
goal of “work being perfect” by employing processes,
such as repeatedly checking work produced, could
become problematic without being able to flexibly
balance this with other goals, such as “completing
work within time limits.” Thus, rigid implementation
of a goal (via a goal-relevant process)7 is equivalent to
pursuing a goal arbitrarily; when this process is imple-
mented without current awareness of the conflict, it
causes with other important goals. Such a conceptua-
lization highlights the importance of (1) understand-
ing the overall goal(s) an individual is trying to
achieve and (2) establishing whether the transdiag-
nostic process that they are employing is in service
of this goal(s).
There is recognition within the neuropsychologi-
cal, clinical, and personality literatures that there is
CONTROLLING SYSTEM
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Figure 2. A model of the closed negative feedback loop described in PCT; definitions of key components are included
within the diagram and a key is provided below (Redrawn by Dag Forssell from a diagram by William T. Powers). See
Powers et al. (2011) for more details. Key: p¼ perceptual signal; r¼ reference signal; e¼ error signal; Qi¼ input quantity;
Q0¼ input quantity; D¼ disturbance; K in each case (Ki, Ko, Kf , Kd)¼ a constant converting amount of input to amount of
output at each of the indicated points in the loop. PCT ¼ perceptual control theory.
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a “trade off” between stable goal maintenance and
flexible goal adaptation in order for an individual to
meet personally important goals (e.g., Brands, Sta-
pert, Ko¨hler, Wade, & van Heugten, 2015; Goschke,
2000; Herd, Hazy, Chatham, Brant, & Friedman,
2014). Although stable stimulus–task associations
allow effective responding under equivalent condi-
tions, they can interfere when a new response is
required (Goschke, 2000). For example, as rumination
can promote maintenance of a certain mindset (stabi-
lity), it can be adaptive in tasks that require goal
maintenance (Altamirano et al., 2010). The capacity
to focus attention on one goal, and employ goal-
related transdiagnostic processes, can be beneficial
in some circumstances (e.g., Brands et al., 2015;
Dunne, Coffey, Gallagher, & Desmond, 2014); how-
ever, not when this is at the ongoing expense of
another important goal (Henselmans et al., 2011).
This supports the suggestion that employment of
transdiagnostic processes can be described as rigid
when it impedes goal progress, as the same process
can both facilitate and impede goal progress depend-
ing on the context.
PCT predicts a crucial role for awareness in order
to reduce rigidity and promote flexibility. Within
PCT, the change mechanism, known as reorganiza-
tion, makes changes to the control system when a
conflict between goals (or error) is detected (Powers,
1973). These changes occur at the point that aware-
ness is directed within the control system. Thus, tar-
geted awareness promotes flexibility, and such
flexibility would entail acting in a way in which an
individual is able to meet all of their important goals
and would require awareness of these higher level
goals (Morris, Mansell, & McEvoy, 2016).
Therefore, our PCT framework specifically pre-
dicts that it is vital to bring awareness to the higher
level goals of the individual to establish whether con-
tinued employment of a particular process is flex-
ible—is employment of this process in line with all
the important goals of the individual? The importance
of considering a broad range of goals has been recog-
nized within the neuropsychological literature with a
recent article, presenting a neural network model of
individual differences in task-switching abilities, sug-
gesting that their model could be enhanced by includ-
ing an “outer loop” for meta-task goal maintenance
(Herd et al., 2014, p. 22). They recognize that indi-
viduals have “trained” on range of tasks throughout
their life and have goals outside of the current task.
This suggests that an individual’s current important
goals can influence whether they switch tasks. In line
with this, the ability of an individual employ trans-
diagnostic processes to meet all of their important
goals is described as meta-flexibility, in order to dis-
tinguish it from task-specific switching processes.
The key implication of this term is that switching can
be used in a flexible way (to support goal pursuit), but
that switching will not always be flexible (will not
always promote goal pursuit). Figure 3(b) illustrates
how higher level conflict can be resolved through
awareness of important goals, and how this can result
in more flexible employment of transdiagnostic
processes.
This meta-flexibility account is in accordance with
the aforementioned conceptualization that there is a
“trade off” between stable goal maintenance and flex-
ible goal adaptation (e.g., Goschke, 2000). Both con-
tinuing with a task and switching to another task can
be adaptive. It is also in accordance with self-
regulatory theories, which emphasize the necessity
of flexibility in order to meet important goals (Carver
& Scheier, 1998; Powers, 1973). For example, both
tenacious pursuit of goals and flexible goal adaptation
Lower-level
conflict
‘Constant’ worry about
concerns
Try to stop worrying
completely
Higher-level
referencesin
conflict
To be safe
To be myself
To be normal
Worry when I need to.
Plan a strategy to deal with
my concerns.
Conflict
To be safe To be normal
Conflict
& 
Rigidity
(a)
(b)
Figure 3. (a) Conflict at higher levels of the control system
leading to rigid employment of transdiagnostic processes
and lower level conflict. (b) Resolution of higher level
conflict through awareness of the reference that is setting
the conflicting goals. Note. The reference “To be myself”
sets the references for “To be safe” and “To be normal.”
Cognitively, this could be experienced as a realization that
both “To be safe” and “To be normal” are valid goals of the
self, and a balance can be achieved where both are met. The
goals are the same as in Figure 2(a), and the individual is still
worrying, but they have greater meta-flexibility (flexibility
in meeting all their important goals).
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have been shown to promote well-being in some
situations and be detrimental to well-being in others
(Henselmans et al., 2011; Wrosch, Scheier, & Miller,
2013). Initial evidence suggests that the degree of
flexibility with which goals are tenaciously pursued
moderates this relationship (Brandtsta¨dter & Renner,
1990; Kelly et al., 2012).
Predictions that can be derived from this explana-
tory framework are that it is when employment of
cognitive/behavioral processes promotes higher level
goal conflict that such employment can truly be
described as rigid and that people recover when
awareness is brought to such higher level conflicts.
A number of accounts, including PCT, suggest that
“negative” emotions8 arise in response to perceiving
stimuli in order to prepare the individual for action
and to meet a goal (Boudreaux & Ozer, 2013; Morris
et al., 2016). It has been suggested and evidenced
elsewhere that negatively valenced emotions arise and
endure when progress toward a goal is impeded (Car-
ver & Scheier, 1998, 2013; Powers, 2005, 2008).
Furthermore, it is recognized that negative emotions
in themselves can make it more difficult for an indi-
vidual to achieve their goals and inhibit transdiagnos-
tic processes and, therefore, can directly contribute to
rigidity. As shown in Figure 1, the same switching and
inhibition deficits that prevent switching from trans-
diagnostic processes can also prevent switching from
and inhibition of negative emotions. For example,
considerable evidence indicates inhibition deficits in
those who are depressed and particularly difficulties
disengaging from negative material and rigid, repeti-
tive rumination (e.g., Joormann, Yoon, & Zetsche,
2007; Koster et al., 2011). However, it is beyond the
scope of this review to fully explore the relationship
between negative emotion and rigidity; where possi-
ble, findings are reported that control for negative
affect. The vicious cycle of negative emotions and
transdiagnostic processes is broken by opportunities
and interventions that broaden the individual’s aware-
ness of their conflicted goals and help them to balance
these more flexibly (Alsawy, Mansell, Carey, McE-
voy, & Tai, 2014). Direct attempts to test these will
require further research, which we return to in the
discussion.
A review of the constructive and unconstructive
consequences of repetitive thought concluded that a
control theory account was the only one that explicitly
hypothesized that repetitive thinking could have con-
structive as well as unconstructive consequences and,
therefore, provided the most robust account (Watkins,
2008). Further, a control theory framework has been
used elsewhere to explain the contexts in which a
process can be both constructive and unconstructive
(Egan, Wade, et al., 2011; Mansell, 2012). For exam-
ple, in order to develop a clearer understanding of the
form of perfectionism that maintains psychopathol-
ogy, Shafran et al. (2002) have suggested a concep-
tualization of clinical perfectionism. What underlies
such pathological perfectionism is whether unobtain-
able personal goals are rigidly pursued, that is, goals
that cannot be obtained and/or that strongly conflict
with other important goals (Egan, Piek, et al., 2011).
Our use of a PCT framework allows that certain cog-
nitive and behavioral processes are conceptualized in
terms of rigidity and, therefore, are more likely to
cause conflict and psychopathology. However, given
our explicit emphasis that such processes are rigid
only when they promote conflict with an individual’s
other important goals, a therapist (or researcher) is
less likely to assume a particular process is always
maladaptive.
Therefore, elaborated control theory accounts can
provide a specification of cognitive/behavioral main-
tenance processes that explains why these can be
inconsistently associated with psychopathology (Wat-
kins, 2008). In summary, this specification is that
effective self-regulation requires flexible coordina-
tion between different levels within the goal hierarchy
in order to meet valued goals (Carver & Scheier,
1998; Powers, 1973; Watkins, 2008). This entails
responding to the contextual demands of different cir-
cumstances, that is, the employment of the most
appropriate level within the goal hierarchy to meet
the current task demands and the employment of cor-
respondingly appropriate cognitive/behavioral pro-
cesses (Watkins, 2008). However, such accounts do
not specify that difficulties in switching (or inhibiting
previously relevant task set) could impede appropriate
employment of transdiagnostic cognitive/behavioral
processes. Consequently, the PCT-informed frame-
work presented here (see Figure 1) proposes that high
levels of cognitive flexibility enable an individual to
employ a transdiagnostic process (e.g., worry, thought
suppression) in a way that ameliorates against their
distress and may even have benefits. More specifi-
cally for the purposes of the current review, our
framework predicts an association between transdiag-
nostic processes and psychopathology as a conse-
quence of the fact that the existing measures of such
processes partly assess the rigidity with which they
are applied. This view would be supported by the
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finding of consistent correlations between transdiag-
nostic processes and predefined measures of rigidity.
This is the purpose of our systematic review.
Aims and hypotheses
As explained earlier, the aim of our review was to
systematically examine the relationship between
rigidity/flexibility and transdiagnostic processes that
maintain psychopathology. We predicted that the
majority of studies would find a correlational, or pre-
dictive, relationship between the measures of rigidity/
flexibility and transdiagnostic processes. Correla-
tional studies will provide evidence as to whether
rigidity is commonly related to transdiagnostic pro-
cesses. Of particular interest and support for the argu-
ment presented are studies that describe interaction
effects (individuals who score highly on levels of
rigidity and highly on levels of maintenance processes
exhibit greater psychopathology) or that indicate that
rigidity/flexibility predicts transdiagnostic processes.
Method
The methodology was informed by preferred report-
ing items for systematic reviews and meta-analyses
(PRISMAs) statement (Moher, Liberati, Tetzlaff, &
Altman, 2009; see Appendix A). A meta-analytic
approach was considered, but it was concluded that
this would not be methodologically sound as any
aggregation would be difficult to interpret due to het-
erogeneity in the designs of included studies and mea-
sures used (Liberati et al., 2009). Reviewed studies
have used decidedly different methodologies and par-
ticipant groups, and using meta-analytic approaches
in such circumstances can mask important differences
in findings (Cooper, 2003; Hinshaw, 2009).
Included measures
All measures of rigidity and flexibility that were cov-
ered by our definitions were included. Measures of
switching and inhibition of task set will be included
within the review. Measures of inhibitory processes
that promote goal maintenance will not be included
within this review. The experimental, self-report, and
interview paradigms included are detailed below.
The experimental paradigms that measured switch-
ing and inhibition of previous task set were affective
shift task, internal shift task, set-shift task, cognitive
set shift task (CatBat), task-switching paradigm, Wis-
consin card sorting test (WCST; including advanced
section), modified card sorting task, negative affec-
tive priming paradigm, modified Sternberg task, anti-
saccade task, trail making test (TMT), Delis–Kaplan
EF system TMT, Brixton test, picture set test, haptic
illusion task (perceptual shift), and probabilistic
reversal-learning task (involves shifting as the stimu-
lus that was previously correct became incorrect, and
vice versa). Shifting tasks (including the WCST, pic-
ture set test, and Brixton test) involve changing
response pattern when a task rule changes; for exam-
ple, the WCST involves sorting cards according to a
rule that participants must ascertain purely from feed-
back as to whether their selection is right or wrong,
the rule changes every 10 cards, and so participants
must change their response once the rule changes. The
term “task-switching paradigms” is generally used for
tasks that involve similar shifting processes but also
allow specific measurement of different EFs that may
affect performance. Notably, some of the older
performance-based measures (e.g., the WCST)
involve a number of neurocognitive processes, such
as substantial working memory demands (e.g., Hamp-
shire & Owen, 2006; Wildes, Forbes, & Marcus,
2014) and, therefore, should be interpreted with
caution.
The self-report measures of flexibility were Accep-
tance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ)–II and the
flexibility subscale of the O’Brien Multiphasic Nar-
cissism Inventory (OMNI). The self-report measures
of rigidity were Persistence, Perseveration and Perfec-
tionism Questionnaire (perseveration subscale); Test
of Behavioral Rigidity (TBR), Rigidity Question-
naire; and Behavior Rating Inventory of EF—Adult
Version (shift subscale). The EATATE interview
paradigm was used to measure rigidity (inflexibility
and being bound by rules).
It should be noted that self-report and experimental
paradigms might measure different aspects of the
same construct. For example, self-report measures
might reflect a “typical performance,” whereas
experimental measures provide greater control and
tap performance on a specific occasion(s) (Hofmann,
Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005).
However, both types of study were included so that
the relationships of interest could be examined in a
comprehensive manner across methodologies.
Furthermore, most available studies used a combina-
tion of self-report and experimental paradigms.
These measures are diverse and variable in their
psychometric properties; for example, a number of
these measures have not been cross-validated with
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other measures of rigidity and flexibility (Chown,
1959; Schultz & Searleman, 2002; Steinmetz et al.,
2011). One measure with somewhat variable psycho-
metric properties is the AAQ. The AAQ has a 16-item
and a 9-item version, which have both predicted a
wide range of outcomes (Bond et al., 2011; Hayes
et al., 2006). However, the internal consistency has
been low in a number of studies and the factor struc-
ture has been somewhat unstable (Bond et al., 2011).
Recently, a 7-item AAQ-II has been developed and
initial research has demonstrated sound factor struc-
ture and good reliability (Bond et al., 2011).
Data sources
Databases utilized in all searches were Embase (from
1974 to November 2014), MEDLINE (from 1946 to
November 2014), and PsycINFO (from 1806 to
November 2014). Restrictions imposed during
searches were to identify studies that (a) were original
peer-reviewed research articles, (b) used human par-
ticipants, and (c) were written in English. For each
study included in the review, manual searches of ref-
erence lists were conducted. One author was con-
tacted to obtain additional data that were referred to
in a study; they were unable to provide the informa-
tion and the study was excluded.
Study selection
In order to identify the transdiagnostic processes to be
included in this review, initial searches of reviews and
relevant articles within this area were conducted (see
Figure 4). A list of all processes identified in the book
by Harvey et al. was compiled (Harvey et al., 2004).
This book was the first attempt to review whether a
number of cognitive and behavioral processes were
common across a range of disorders. All processes they
identified as transdiagnostic were included in the initial
search terms. Given that this book was published in
2004, and in order to be as inclusive as possible, further
transdiagnostic processes were included. Whether a
process was considered to be transdiagnostic was
determined by similar criteria to Harvey et al. (2004);
that a process has been investigated in four or more
disorders and the majority of evidence indicated that
the process was present within all of these disorders. In
addition, intolerance of ambiguity was included due to
conceptual similarities with intolerance of uncertainty,
despite being under-researched in clinical populations
(Grenier et al., 2005). This resulted in a list of 18
processes: all-or-nothing/dichotomous thinking,
selective attention/attentional bias, attentional avoid-
ance, elective memory, interpretation reasoning bias,
expectation reasoning bias, emotional reasoning bias,
avoidance behavior, safety behavior, experiential
avoidance, pessimistic attributional style, intolerance
uncertainty, intolerance ambiguity, worry, rumination,
impulsivity, compulsivity, and perfectionism. All pro-
cesses that this review mentions in detail are included
in Table 1.
From this list, a preliminary abstract search was run
for each of these 18 processes AND rigidity and for each
of these processes AND flexibility. If these two searches
generated a total of five or more potentially relevant
papers, based on the abstract only, then the style was
kept in the review. A paper was deemed appropriate in
this regard if it reported an empirical study regarding
associations or causal relationships between a trans-
diagnostic process and measures of rigidity or flexibility
in an Adult Axis 1 disorder sample. Appendix B pro-
vides full search terms across all searches.
Based on this process, the transdiagnostic processes
searched were selective attention/attentional bias,
dichotomous thinking, rumination, worry, perfection-
ism, intolerance of ambiguity, compulsivity, and impul-
sivity. The search strategy used was to run an abstract
search for studies using one of these processes AND a
search term related to rigidity or flexibility. The searches
identified 2,682 citations (after de-duplication).
Relevant titles and abstracts were identified against
the following prespecified inclusion and exclusion
criteria. Articles were included that were written in
Figure 4. Selection of studies.
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English and that reported at least one empirical study
regarding associations or causal relationships between
specified processes and measures of rigidity or flexi-
bility in an Adult Axis 1 disorder sample. Studies
using analogue samples were also included when
these measured subthreshold levels of transdiagnostic
processes (e.g., high rumination). For example, corre-
lational studies, studies investigating predictor vari-
ables, or prospective studies were included. Axis 1
disorders were focused upon in line with Harvey
et al. (2004) and to keep the scope of the review
manageable. Although Diagnostic and statistical man-
ual of mental disorders (DSM-V) does not have axes,
all the available research was conducted within pre-
vious versions of DSM (American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation, 1994).
Measures were included that measured rigidity/
flexibility, and a relevant cognitive/behavioral pro-
cess, experimentally or by self-report. Measures of
switching were included, as were those that measured
inhibition of previous task set, for example, difficul-
ties inhibiting recently relevant information.
Citation searches were conducted on all papers
included within the review, plus all examined full
texts. Given the breadth of the search criteria in
instances when an abstract was clearly not relevant,
the full text was not searched; however, for all
abstracts whereby potentially relevant tests, relation-
ships or constructs were described that the full text
was searched. For example, if an examination of cog-
nitive flexibility was described, but it was not clear
whether a relationship with a relevant process was
examined, then the full text would be checked for
relevance and for relevant citations.
Excluded were studies using nonhuman samples,
samples of individuals with brain damage/organic
brain impairment, samples of individuals with perva-
sive developmental disorder, samples of individuals
with learning disability, child/adolescent samples
(studies primarily with adults but which included data
from participants aged 15 and over were included),
and studies where participants were under the influ-
ence of drugs or alcohol. Appendix A provides an
overview of the assessment of study quality.
Results
All tables report overall study design and the specific
analysis/analyses used within the systematic review.
Where partial eta squared (Z2p) is used as a measure of
effect size, the benchmarks of Cohen (1969) are used
to indicate small, medium, and large effects (based
upon values of f that correspond to values of Z2p of
.0099, .0588, and .1379, respectively) (Cohen, 1969;
Richardson, 2011). Effect size is reported using Pear-
son’s r wherever appropriate and, where possible, has
been calculated for studies in which no effect size has
been given. Person’s r was calculated using (1) mean,
standard deviation, and sample size (for one study,
this was calculated without an available sample
size); (2) F-test statistics (F-value, sample size); and
(3) T-value (T-value, sample size).
Rumination
Eight studies found that rumination was associated
with task-switching difficulties using a variety of
experimental tasks (Altamirano et al., 2010; Brinker,
Campisi, Gibbs, & Izzard, 2013; Davis & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2000; De Lissnyder, Koster, & De Raedt,
2012a; De Lissnyder, Koster, Goubert, et al., 2012b;
Koster, De Lissnyder, & De Raedt, 2013) (see Table
2). However, one study found more mixed results on
the WCST; depressive brooding was associated with
categories completed, but not perseverative errors
(Miranda, Valderrama, Tsypes, Gadol, & Gallagher,
2013). Five studies indicated that such switching dif-
ficulties in ruminators were more strongly related to
difficulties inhibiting previously relevant task set than
difficulties in switching task per se (De Lissnyder,
Derakshan, De Raedt, & Koster, 2011; De Lissnyder,
Koster, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2010; Meiran, Dia-
mond, Toder, & Nemets, 2011; Whitmer & Banich,
2007). The majority of these studies used the Rumi-
native Response Scale (RRS; long or short form) to
measure rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow,
1991; Treynor et al., 2003).9 The pattern of results
has been replicated in a clinical sample (Whitmer &
Gotlib, 2012).
Two further studies indicate that rumination is
associated with difficulties inhibiting previously rel-
evant information (Owens & Derakshan, 2013;
Zetsche & Joormann, 2011). In contrast, in one study,
a rumination manipulation interfered with inhibitory
processes in the dysphoric group only (Philippot &
Brutoux, 2008). However, this study could not clearly
differentiate between switching and inhibitory defi-
cits and is also limited by a relatively small sample
size (approximately 20 per group).
Emotional material may impact on the degree of
impairment, with research suggesting that inhibitory
deficits are particularly marked with regard to
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negative stimuli. Specifically, three studies indicated
that depressive rumination predicted deficits in inhi-
biting negative information (De Lissnyder et al.,
2010; Joormann & Gotlib, 2008) and in set-shifting
(Koster et al., 2013). Further, Genet, Malooly, and
Siemer (2013) found that deficits in affective flexibil-
ity predicted increased rumination, but this only
applied when participants were switching away from
negative material. However, one study has indicated
that high ruminators demonstrated more impaired
inhibition for both positive and negative words than
low ruminators (controlling for depression) (Joor-
mann, 2006).
Overall, findings of the 19 studies in this section
suggested that deficits in switching were associated
with, and maybe predictive of, ruminative thinking.
This supports the hypothesis that rigidity is associated
with rumination. In the majority of studies, associa-
tions between switching and rumination remained sig-
nificant when depression was controlled for. A range
of paradigms were used to measure switching and
inhibition. Six experiments indicated that trait rumi-
nation had a greater impact on inhibiting previously
relevant task set than non-inhibitory switching pro-
cesses. Although much of the evidence is from analo-
gue samples, and none of the studies utilized random
sampling, there are three studies that report results
from clinical populations (generally with depression).
Effect sizes are variable from fairly small (r ¼ .18) to
large (r ¼ .69).
Perfectionism
In five studies within clinical and nonclinical samples,
perfectionism and rigidity were associated (Grilo,
2004; Leyro, Berenz, Brandt, Smits, & Zvolensky,
2012; Lindner, Fichter, & Quadflieg, 2014; Serpell,
Waller, Fearon, & Meyer, 2009; Waller et al., 2012)
(see Table 3). In two studies, some measures of rigid-
ity and flexibility were correlated with or predictive
of perfectionism, but this was not consistent (Tchan-
turia, Morris, et al., 2004; Wetterneck et al., 2011). In
a sample of clients with Obsessive compulsive disor-
der (OCD), a significant correlation was found
between the OMNI Flexibility and Frost Multidimen-
sional Perfectionism Scale (FMPS) doubts about
actions subscale; however, no other significant corre-
lations between the FMPS and Flexibility subscale
were found (Wetterneck et al., 2011). Childhood per-
fectionism in individuals with current anorexia, or in
long-term recovery, was strongly predictive of
performance on the trail making and Brixton tasks
(Tchanturia, Anderluh, et al., 2004). However, child-
hood perfectionism was not predictive of rigidity on
the other measures used, although this may reflect the
measures, because these involved a range of percep-
tual, semantic, and other capabilities.
Overall, the research within these seven studies
supports a relationship between rigidity and perfec-
tionism. However, one study in a clinical sample
found no correlation between shift costs and perfec-
tionism (Filoteo et al., 2014). A further study in a
clinical sample found that dichotomous thinking and
rigidity (assessed by the TBR) combined were signif-
icant predictors of negative perfectionism, but only
dichotomous thinking was a significant predictor of
unique variance (Egan, Piek, Dyck, & Rees, 2007).
However, the authors note that the TBR did not seem
to adequately capture the clinical construct of rigidity.
Interestingly, Short, Mushquash, and Sherry (2013)
found that while the FMPS doubts about action sub-
scale was not correlated with perseveration on the
Stroop task, there was an interaction between doubts
about action and perseveration. Individuals who
scored higher on perseveration and doubts about
actions were more likely to engage in increased binge
eating; thus these two styles together contributed to
increased binging.
Overall, there is some evidence that rigidity and
perfectionism are related. In a number of studies,
measures of these two constructs were correlated
(with r values of .39, .51, and .61). In one study,
perfectionism predicted rigidity. However, the find-
ings are preliminary and not totally consistent across
measures. Insufficient studies have examined whether
inhibition of task set or switching specific difficulties
are more strongly associated with perfectionism.
None of the studies utilized random sampling.
Compulsive behavior
In two student samples, perseveration/inflexibility
was correlated with compulsive behaviors (Lawrence
et al., 2006; Zohar, LaBuda, & Moschel-Ravid, 1995)
(see Table 4). However, the magnitudes of the corre-
lations were low. In another student sample, the
AAQ-II was significantly positively correlated with
Obsessive Compulsive Inventory–Revised washing
subscale (Abramowitz, Lackey, & Wheaton, 2009).
Given that it is stated in this study that the version
of the AAQ-II used entails that higher scores indicate
greater flexibility (less pathology), the direction of
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Table 3. Characteristics of studies investigating perfectionism and rigidity/flexibility.
Study
Population, design (anal-
ysis if different from
design)
Measure of
perfectionism
Measure of flexibility/
rigidity Findings
Egan et al.
(2007)
Depression/anxiety
disorder, correlational
(regression)
PANPS TBR RQ Dichotomous thinking and rigidity
combined significant predictors of
negative perfectionism in clinical
sample (R2 ¼ .71, p ¼ .0001, r ¼
.84). But only dichotomous thinking
was a significant predictor of a
unique 43% of variance
Filoteo et al.
(2014)
Anorexia nervosa,
between groups
(correlation)
Perfectionism
subscale from
EDI-2
Adapted category
learning task
No significant correlation between
shift costs and perfectionism
Grilo (2004) Binge eating disorder,
factor analytical
(correlation)
DIPD-IV
perfectionism
DIPD-IV rigidity factor Rigidity and perfectionism factors
most highly correlated with the
three factors, r ¼ .51, p < .001
Leyro et al.
(2012)
Community (some with
depression/anxiety),
between groups
(correlation)
PPPQ
perfectionism
PPPQ perseveration Perseveration correlated with
perfectionism (r ¼ .61, p < .001)
Lindner et al.
(2014)
Anorexia recovered,
between groups
(correlation)
FMPS BCST Number of perseverations correlated
with perfectionism in the recovered
anorexia group (r ¼ .29, p ¼ .004)
Serpell et al.
(2009)
Nonclinical, factor
analytical (correlation/
regression)
PPPQ
perfectionism
PPPQ perseveration Perseveration and perfectionism
subscales correlated, r¼ .39, p < .01
Short et al.
(2013)
Nonclinical, multi-
method (correlation
and regression)
Doubts about
actions
subscale:
FMPS
Stroop (including
assessment of ability
to switch previous
task set)
Perseveration not correlated with
doubts about actions.
Simple slopes analyses for individuals
with low versus high perseveration
indicated “doubts about actions”
was a more robust predictor of
binge eating for highly perseverative
individuals (p < .001, b ¼ .41)
Tchanturia,
Morris, et
al.
(2004)
Eating disorders,
between groups
(regression)
EATATE
interview
1. Brixton task
2. TMT
3. Cognitive set
shift task
(CatBat)
4. Picture set task
5. Haptic illusion
task
6. EATATE
Childhood
perfectionism was strongly
predictive of performance on the
TMT (time: p¼ .01, b¼ .49; errors:
p¼ .05, b¼ .43) and on the Brixton
task (p ¼ .004, b ¼ .54)
Waller et al.
(2012)
Eating disorders and
clinical comparison
group, between
groups (correlation)
PPPQ
perfectionism
PPPQ perseveration Perseveration and perfectionism
subscales correlated, r ¼ .35,
p < .001
Wetterneck
et al.
(2011)
OCD, correlational FMPS OMNI OMNI Flexibility and FMPS
doubts about actions correlated (r
¼ .29, p < .05)
Notes. BCST ¼ Biology Card Sorting Task; DIPD-IV¼ Diagnostic Interview for DSM-IV Personality Disorders; EDI-2¼ Eating Disorder
Inventory-2; FMPS¼ Frost Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale; OMNI¼O’Brien Multiphasic Narcissism Inventory; PPPQ¼ Persistence,
Perseveration and Perfectionism Questionnaire; PANPS¼ Positive and Negative Perfectionism Scale; TMT¼ trail making test; TBR RQ¼
Test of Behavioral Rigidity, Rigidity Questionnaire.
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Table 4. Characteristics of studies investigating compulsive behavior and rigidity/flexibility.
Study
Population,
setting, design
Measure of
compulsive
behavior
Measure of
flexibility/
rigidity Findings
Abramowitz
et al.
(2009)
Nonclinical,
correlational
OCI-R AAQ-II (10-
item)
Correlation between AAQ-II and OCI-R
washing subscale washing, r ¼ .21, p < .05
Anderluh
et al.
(2009)
Eating disorders,
between groups
(Mann–Whitney),
and predictive
EATATE interview EATATE
interview
Participants who reported childhood
inflexibility had significantly longer duration of
dieting (p < .005, r ¼ .26), fasting (p < .01, r ¼
.28), and shorter periods of regular binge
eating (p < .001, r ¼ .29) than those without.
Participants who reported being bound by
rules in childhood experienced significantly
longer lifetime periods of excessive exercising
(p < .005, r ¼ .35)
Gloster et al.
(2011)
Nonclinical,
correlational
OCI-R AAQ-II (7-item) AAQ-II significantly correlated with the OCI
washing (r ¼ .29), hoarding (r ¼ .31),
ordering (r ¼ .29), checking (r ¼ .28), and
neutralizing (r ¼ .28) subscales
Hashimoto
et al.
(2011)
OCD, between
groups analysis
(correlational)
YBOCS
PI
TMT Symmetry/ordering subscale significantly
associated with switching difficulties on the
TMT (r ¼ .777, p ¼ .001)
Trend toward significant correlation between
switching score on TMT and PI checking scale
(r ¼ .291, p ¼ .021)
Kanakam
et al.
(2013)
Eating disorders,
between groups
(correlation)
OCI-R 1. WCST
2. EATATE
Perseverative errors on WCST significantly
associated with ordering subscale (r ¼ .29, p
¼ .04)
Perseverative errors associated with need for
order and symmetry in childhood
Kelly et al.
(2013)
Nonclinical, between
groups
(correlation)
EDE-Q WCST Total binge episodes associated with
perseverative responses (r ¼ .33), more
binge episodes were associated with greater
perseveration
Kumbhani
et al.
(2010)
Schizophrenia,
between groups
(correlation)
OCI-R 1. DKEFS
TM and
WCST
2. BRIEF-A
1. Hoarding associated with poorer
switching ability on the TM, r ¼ .41 (p
< .05). Performance on the WCST not
significantly correlated with OCI-R.
2. Self-rated shift score on the BRIEF-A not
correlated with OCI-R subscales;
however, informant rated shift
correlated with checking (r ¼ .41, p <
.01) and hoarding (r ¼ .37, p < .05)
Lawrence
et al.
(2006)
OCD, between
groups
(regression)
OCI-R WCST Perseverative errors on WCST associated with
symmetry/order symptoms on the OCI-R (R2
¼ .13, p < .03, r ¼ .36)
Manning
et al.
(2013)
Pathological
gambling, between
groups
(correlation)
SOGS IED No significant correlation between IED set shift
and SOGS
McMillan
et al.
(2013)
Hoarding,
correlational
Saving inventory
revised
WCST Hoarding behavior positively correlated with
“failure to maintain set”
(continued)
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this correlation is surprising. However, it is also stated
that AAQ-II is being used to measure experimental
avoidance. Therefore, the findings must be interpreted
with caution, because if the AAQ-II indicated greater
experiential avoidance, then the correlation would be
in the direction expected.
In three studies of clients with OCD, either check-
ing or ordering behaviors were associated with
greater rigidity (Hashimoto et al., 2011; Lawrence
et al., 2006; Wetterneck et al., 2011). One study was
methodologically limited as the sample size for the
regression analysis was very low (n ¼ 39), given the
number of predictors (12) (Lawrence et al., 2006). In
clients with compulsive hoarding, hoarding was
associated with perseverative errors and hoarding
severity correlated with failure to maintain set
(McMillan, Rees, & Pestell, 2013). In addition, a
study with clients with schizophrenia and OCD
symptoms found that perseverative errors and poorer
set-shifting were significantly associated with
checking at baseline, but not at 12-month follow-
up (Schirmbeck et al., 2013). Conversely, TMT-B
was not significantly associated with checking at
baseline but was at 12-month follow-up. The major-
ity of these studies support the relationship between
compulsive behavior and rigidity. This has been fur-
ther replicated in a sample of clients with schizo-
phrenia (with no history of OCD); hoarding was
associated with poorer switching ability (Kumbhani,
Roth, Kruck, Flashman, & McAllister, 2010).
Further three studies of individuals with eating dis-
orders (or eating difficulties) supported the relation-
ship between rigidity and compulsive behavior. A
large study investigated the association between rigid-
ity in childhood (indicated by inflexibility and rule-
bound traits) and a number of compulsive behaviors
(Anderluh, Tchanturia, Rabe-Hesketh, Collier, &
Treasure, 2009). Participants who reported
Table 4. (continued)
Study
Population,
setting, design
Measure of
compulsive
behavior
Measure of
flexibility/
rigidity Findings
Schirmbeck
et al.
(2013)
Schizophrenia/
schizoaffective
disorder including
clients with
obsessive-
compulsive
symptoms,
prospective
(correlation)
Hamburger–
Zwangsinventar:
checking
1. WCST
2. TMT-B
3. Set-shift
task
1. Perseverative errors associated with
checking at baseline (r ¼ .31, p ¼ .007),
but not at 12-month follow-up
2. TMT-B not significantly associated with
checking at baseline, but was at follow-
up (r ¼ .42, p ¼ .003)
3. Poorer set shifting associated with
checking at baseline (r ¼ .29, p ¼ .015),
but not at follow-up
Short et al.
(2013)
Nonclinical, multi-
method
(correlation and
regression)
Binge eating
subscale from
Eating Disorder
Diagnostic Scale
Stroop
(including
assessment of
ability to
switch
previous task
set)
Perseveration was not correlated with binge
eating
Wetterneck
et al.
(2011)
OCD, correlational
(correlation and
regression)
OCI-R OMNI Flexibility not significantly correlated with
checking; ordering and neutralizing (p < .10)
Zohar et al.
(1995)
Nonclinical,
correlational
MOCI-R WCST Checking subscale of the MOCI (but not the
washing, doubting, or slowness subscales)
correlated with perseveration score on the
WCST (r ¼ .24, p < .01)
Notes. AAQ-II ¼ Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II; BRIEF-A ¼ Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Function-Adult Version;
DKEFS TM ¼ Delis–Kaplan executive function system, trail making; IED ¼ Intra- extra Dimensional Set-shift; MOCI-R ¼ Maudsley
Obsessive Compulsive Inventory–Revised; OCI-R ¼ Obsessive Compulsive Inventory–Revised; OMNI ¼ O’Brien Multiphasic Nar-
cissism Inventory; SOGS ¼ South Oaks Gambling Screen; PI ¼ Padua Inventory; TMT ¼ trail making test; WCST ¼ Wisconsin card
sorting test; YBOCS ¼ Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale.
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inflexibility in childhood had significantly longer
duration of dieting and fasting and shorter duration
of periods of regular binge eating than participants
without this trait. A further study indicated that per-
severative errors were significantly positively associ-
ated with ordering behaviors and need for order and
symmetry in childhood (Kanakam, Raoult, Collier, &
Treasure, 2013). In a nonclinical sample, the number
of binge episodes was correlated with WCST perse-
verative errors (Kelly, Bulik, & Mazzeo, 2013).
As aforementioned, Short et al. (2013) found that
individuals who scored higher on perseveration and
doubts about actions were more likely to engage in
increased binge eating; thus, these two processes
together contributed to increased binging.
Overall studies provided evidence that compulsive
behaviors were associated with rigidity. One study
found that rigidity prospectively predicted a range
of compulsive behaviors. Across all studies in this
area, associations between rigidity/flexibility mea-
sures and compulsive behaviors were generally mod-
erate to low. Additional research with clinical
populations, which includes interaction terms, would
be beneficial.
Impulsivity
The results of studies in this domain were somewhat
mixed. Three studies in substance-dependent clients
or nonclinical samples found that impulsivity was
associated with rigidity (Ersche, Roiser, Robbins, &
Sahakian, 2008; Fernandez-Serrano, Perales,
Moreno-Lopez, Perez-Garcia, & Verdejo-Garcia,
2012; Van den Broek & Bradshaw, 1993) (see Table
5). However, Salgado et al. (2009) found no signifi-
cant correlations between the WCST and the mea-
sures of impulsivity in an alcohol-dependent group.
Another study found that higher impulsivity was asso-
ciated with greater rigidity but failed to reach signifi-
cance (Sweitzer, Allen, & Kaut, 2008); group
numbers were fairly low at 17–21 per group.
Perseverations were significantly negative corre-
lated with impulsiveness in recovered anorexic indi-
viduals and controls (Lindner et al., 2014). This was
supported by a further study, in which impulsive anor-
exic clients showed significantly more shift errors
than “normal performers” (Galimberti, Martoni,
Cavallini, Erzegovesi, & Bellodi, 2012). However,
the sample size for this analysis was very low.
Overall, the studies with clinical samples have gen-
erally found that impulsivity is associated with
rigidity (with r values of .21–.50). Studies using ana-
logue samples provide additional, albeit limited, sup-
port that rigidity and impulsivity are associated.
Again, the methodological quality of a number of
studies is limited, including small sample sizes and
lack of random sampling. Fewer studies in this
domain used the newer and more precise switching
paradigms. For example, few studies used paradigms
that could discriminate between difficulties in inhibit-
ing previously relevant task set and difficulties in
switching per se. In summary, only a limited number
of studies have investigated the relationship between
impulsivity and rigidity; however, where both of these
are present, they have generally been found to
correlate.
Other studies: Selective attention and worry
This section reports the results of two studies: one
regarding attentional bias and one worry. Deveney
and Deldin (2006) indicated that individuals with
major depressive disorder (MDD) performed more
poorly than controls on an affective flexibility task
when stimuli were negative; one can infer from this
that the degree of flexibility was influence by atten-
tional bias.
A study using combination of different measure-
ment paradigms found that cortisol reactivity and
task-switching costs interacted to predict worry, but
higher task-switching costs alone did not predict
worry (Robinson, Ode, & Hilmert, 2011).
Clearly, there is insufficient to be able to draw any
conclusions in these domains; however, the study on
attentional bias supports earlier studies that found that
emotionally salient material could result in greater
impairments in switching and inhibition. It would
have been useful if these studies examined whether
rumination or worry moderated this relationship.
Discussion
In the areas covered by this review, the majority of
studies have found a relationship between measures of
rigidity and processes that can maintain pathology.
Measures of rigidity were correlated with, predictive
of (or predicted by), the processes examined. How-
ever, whether a significant relationship was found
varied somewhat depending on the measures used.
Relationships were nearly always in the expected
direction, that is, greater rigidity was correlated with,
or predictive of, greater levels of the transdiagnostic
process (or greater levels of the process were more
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predictive of rigidity). The majority of studies used
switching paradigms to measure levels of rigidity, but
rigidity was also used to refer to a broader range of
paradigms (e.g., inhibition and self-report measures)
(Joormann, Levens, & Gotlib, 2011; Tchanturia, Mor-
ris, et al., 2004; Whitmer & Banich, 2007).
Table 5. Characteristics of studies investigating impulsivity and rigidity/flexibility.
Study
Population,
setting, design
Measure of
impulsivity
Measure of
flexibility/rigidity Findings
Ersche et al.
(2008)
Drug
dependent,
between
groups
(correlation)
BIS-11 PROB task BIS non-planning score correlated with
perseverative errors (r ¼ .26, p ¼ .002). BIS
total scores showed a trend toward
correlating with perseverative errors (r¼ .22,
p ¼ .010)
Fernandez-
Serrano
et al.
(2012)
Cocaine
dependent,
between
groups
(correlation/
regression)
UPPS-P impulsive
behavior scale
1. Stroop
(including
switching
index)
2. PROB
task
1. Cocaine dependent not significantly
more impaired switching than control
group
2. Negative urgency correlated with the
number of perseverative errors (r ¼
.209, p ¼ .049)
Galimberti
et al.
(2012)
Eating
disorders,
between
groups
(ANOVA)
BIS-11 1. ID/ED test Participants were categorized into three groups
(AN, BN, and controls) and were separately
divided into poor, normal, and good
performers on basis of SST score. ID/ED
outcomes were the dependent variables. No
significant differences were found in BN and
control groups, while AN poor performers
showed significantly more errors than normal
performers in ED shift, r ¼ .62, p ¼ .039
Lindner
et al.
(2014)
Anorexia,
recovered,
between
groups
(correlation)
BIS-11 BCST Perseverations significantly negative correlated
with impulsiveness (r ¼ .20, p ¼ .004)
Salgado et al.
(2009)
Alcohol
dependent,
between
groups
(correlation)
IGT: non-planning
impulsivity
WCST In the alcohol-dependent group, no significant
correlation found between measures of
impulsivity and the WCST
Sweitzer
et al.
(2008)
Nonclinical,
between
groups
(ANOVA)
1. BIS-11
2. Delay
Discounting
Questionnaire
3. IGT
WCST No significant differences in number of
perseverative errors between the high
impulsive, medium impulsive, and low
impulsive groups
Van den
Broek and
Bradshaw
(1993)
Nonclinical,
correlational
1. MFFT
2. BIS-8
MCST 1. Significant correlation between
perseverative errors and impulsiveness
index (MFFT) (r ¼ .50, p < .01).
Remained significant when age and
intelligence were held constant (r ¼ .42,
p < .02)
2. No significant correlation between
perseverative errors and BIS-8
impulsiveness
Notes. AN ¼ Anorexia Nervosa; BIS-11 ¼ Barratt Impulsiveness Scale 11; BN ¼ Bulimia Nervosa; DKEFS ¼ Delis–Kaplan executive
function system; ID/ED test ¼ intra-extra dimensional set shifting test; IGT ¼ Iowa gambling task; MCST ¼ modified card sorting task;
MFFT ¼ matching familiar figures test; PROB ¼ Probabilistic Reversal-Learning; SST¼ stop signal task; UPPS-P ¼ Urgency Premedi-
tation Perseverance Sensation Seeking; WCST ¼ Wisconsin card sorting test.
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This relationship was most consistently significant
with regard to rumination and perfectionism. The
majority of the 19 studies investigating rumination
utilized between groups or correlational designs and
nonclinical populations; however, there were two pro-
spective studies. Overall, findings suggested that def-
icits in inhibition and switching were associated with,
and maybe predictive of, ruminative thinking. In the
majority of studies, associations between switching
and rumination remained significant when depression
was controlled for. Different experimental paradigms
were used to measure switching and inhibition, but
rumination was primarily measured through a limited
number of self-report measures. A range of effect
sizes were reported, from fairly small to fairly large,
but the majority of studies reported medium effect
sizes. In the area of perfectionism and rigidity, 9 of
the 10 studies reported correlational relationships
between the two constructs, using a range of mea-
sures. Effect sizes were mostly medium to large.
In the other areas, covered (impulsivity and com-
pulsivity) effect sizes, or the consistency of findings,
were lower. The majority of studies found a relation-
ship in the direction expected (with a range of effect
sizes). The studies of impulsivity and compulsivity
rarely used the more precise switching paradigms,
which could contribute to somewhat mixed results.
Does rigid application of transdiagnostic
processes contribute to greater psychopathology?
Overall, correlational or predictive relationships were
demonstrated and findings point to a statistical over-
lap between rigidity and maintenance processes, but
for measures to be tapping into a single construct, a
high correlation value of above .8 would be expected
(Evans, 1996). This suggests that while the measures
overlap (potentially due to features of rigidity within
the measures of maintenance processes themselves),
they also include components that may not contribute
to the shared variance.
One possibility is our proposal that only a rigid
application of these processes contributes to greater
psychopathology. The shared variance could repre-
sent the common rigidity and the unique variance
could represent process-specific factors. However,
because impairments in EF are transdiagnostic, corre-
lations between these and the other transdiagnostic
processes reviewed could be because both of these
are associated with psychopathology. The assessment
of symptoms that constitute psychopathology will
pick up on the observable or reportable signs of the
very processes that are being assessed (e.g., worry,
perseverative compulsion). Although not fully
addressing this issue, a number of the studies
reviewed have included control groups or participants
who are not experiencing psychological distress.
Furthermore, some studies control for low mood,
worry, and other symptoms that could explain some
of the variance. In spite of this, the most reliable way
to test whether transdiagnostic processes in conjunc-
tion with rigidity contribute to psychological distress
would be to examine whether the interaction between
a transdiagnostic process and rigidity predicts the
maintenance and exacerbation of symptoms of psy-
chopathology over time, when controlling for psycho-
pathology at baseline. The authors are not aware of
any such studies and this would be a useful area for
future research.
If rigidity of application is a key factor in whether
maintenance processes are problematic, then it would
be expected that individuals who score high on levels
of rigidity (or low on levels of flexibility) and high on
levels of maintenance processes would be at greater
risk of psychopathology. One study demonstrated that
the interaction between perfectionism and persevera-
tion contributed to increased binge eating, while per-
severation alone did not (Short et al., 2013). Another
study (not included within the systematic review)
found that inhibition moderated the relationship
between impulsiveness and binging/bulimic symp-
toms, but inhibition alone was not correlated with
impulsiveness (Robinson, Pearce, Engel, & Wonder-
lich, 2009). This study did not measure the inhibition
of task-set but indicates that the use of interaction
terms could contribute to an understanding of how
rigidity and transdiagnostic processes relate. These
studies support the hypothesis that transdiagnostic
processes in combination with switching/inhibition
difficulties are predictive of psychopathology.
Four prospective studies have supported the related
hypothesis that inhibition of task set and switching
deficits have a causal role in inflexible employment
of transdiagnostic processes (e.g., Joormann &
Gotlib, 2008). Impaired inhibition predicted Time 2
rumination scores (controlling for rumination and
depressive symptoms at Time 1) (Zetsche & Joor-
mann, 2011). Impaired switching at Time 1 moder-
ated the association between stress and increased
rumination during a later stressful period (De Lissny-
der, Koster, Goubert, et al., 2012). Further, persevera-
tive errors on the WCST predicted suicidal ideation at
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2–3 year follow-up, and ruminative brooding
mediated the relationship between perseverative
errors and suicidal ideation (Miranda et al., 2013).
A large study (97 clients with eating disorders) found
that participants who reported childhood inflexibility
had significantly longer duration of dieting and fast-
ing and shorter duration of periods of regular binge
eating than those without; participants who reported
being bound by rules in childhood experienced signif-
icantly longer lifetime periods of excessive exercising
(Anderluh et al., 2009). This study used a self-report
measure of inflexibility, and it is interesting that
childhood inflexibility was particularly associated
with high levels of compulsive dieting and fasting
in adulthood, but with shorter duration of regular
periods of binge eating. Given that perfectionism has
been found to interact with perseveration to predict
increased binge eating, this area requires further
research (Short et al., 2013). Additional longitudinal
studies are required. Overall, these studies provide
some support for the model presented in Figure 1.
However, they are clearly limited in number, and
directions for future research are discussed in more
detail toward the end of this section.
Which theoretical frameworks may account for
the findings of the review?
These findings are consistent with the PCT explana-
tory framework proposed, but it was not possible to
fully examine specific predictions of the theory based
on the available data. Rigid employment of transdiag-
nostic processes can be problematic because this is
more likely to lead to goal conflict; if one goal is
pursued over another, then the second goal will not
be met (Kelly et al., 2012). As aforementioned, when
a particular process is employed in pursuit of a spe-
cific goal, it would only become problematic if this
process impedes the achievement of another impor-
tant goal. Therefore, when processes are applied
rigidly, that is, repetitively and possibly with limited
volitional control, they are more likely to impede goal
awareness and attainment (Morris et al., 2016; Teachman,
Joormann, Steinman, & Gotlib, 2012).
Specifically, a PCT account would predict that
transdiagnostic processes are associated with distress
when they maintain conflict between higher level
goals. Goal conflict is associated with certain trans-
diagnostic processes (e.g., rumination and perfection-
ism), but it is not always specified/examined whether
these processes are being applied particularly rigidly
or whether higher level conflicts are particularly det-
rimental (Boudreaux & Ozer, 2013; Emmons, King,
& Sheldon, 1993; Martin, Shrira, & Startup, 2004;
Mushquash & Sherry, 2012). Overall, this area
requires more research, including examination of the
relationship between higher level goal conflict, a
range of (rigidly applied) transdiagnostic processes,
and psychological distress. There are several methods
of assessing goal conflict available, which vary in
their capacity to assess conflict between higher level
goals (see Kelly et al., 2015, for a review). For exam-
ple, Varese, Mansell, and Tai (2017) used a modified
version of the goal task (Dickson & MacLeod, 2004)
with additional questions to enable participants to
access important superordinate (higher level) goals
that related to voices. Ratings of goal interference and
facilitation derived from the strivings instrumentality
matrix (Emmons & King, 1988) were used to assess
higher level goals and their degree of conflict. Yet to
date, such assessments of goal conflict have not be
included in studies to test whether a transdiagnostic
process and cognitive rigidity interact to maintain
higher level goal conflict, which in turn mediates the
maintenance of psychological distress.
Related to this, measures of switching and inhibi-
tion can be used to experimentally indicate rigidity.
However, as previously described and indicated in
Figure 1, according to our theoretical account,
whether a transdiagnostic process is truly being
employed rigidly is determined by whether it conflicts
with an individual’s goals. Paradigms described in the
previous paragraph can be used to measure goal con-
flict. The paradigm used by Varese et al. (2017) could
be adapted so that participants are asked specific
questions about why they are using a particular pro-
cess, and the same procedure could be used to ask
about general goals that are important to participants.
For example, the internal switch task could be admi-
nistered to participants with MDD, levels of rumina-
tion could be measured with the Response Styles
Questionnaire, then the paradigm to enable identifi-
cation of higher level goals could be used to (1) iden-
tify goals related to rumination (e.g., is rumination
perceived to help understand problems or perceived
to be unhelpful) and (2) overall goals (e.g., overall
important life goals, such as being a good parent,
getting into a relationship). It would be predicted that
the degree of conflict between goals related to rumi-
nation and overall goals would mediate levels of
depression (higher conflict associated with higher
depression). Further, that those with negative
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appraisals of rumination (as unhelpful) would demon-
strate higher switching and inhibition difficulties,
because they would not believe that rumination
helped them achieve their goals.
The finding that impaired inhibition of previously
relevant task set is associated with rumination is con-
sistent with Koster et al.’s (2011) useful “impaired
disengagement hypothesis” of depressive rumination.
However, it is suggested that this micro-theory is con-
sistent with the broader PCT explanation, as the
“impaired disengagement hypothesis” emphasizes
how ruminative thought is problematic when it con-
flicts with an individual’s self-view. For example,
self-criticism or negative self-referential thinking
commonly undermines the goals of positive self-
regard. Further, the account states that, while the
internal conflict signal will often promote disengage-
ment from rumination, it is when individuals do not
disengage that rumination increases symptoms and
can negatively affect functioning (Rawal, Park, &
Williams, 2010; Watkins & Moulds, 2005). In line
with studies reviewed that indicated valence-
specific biases (De Lissnyder et al., 2010; De Liss-
nyder, Koster, Goubert, et al., 2012; Genet et al.,
2013), this account suggests that negative mood may
increase the chances of impaired disengagement
from rumination (Koster et al., 2011). In accordance
with PCT, the “impaired disengagement hypothesis”
explains that it is only when rumination causes con-
flict, and this processing endures, that rumination is
pathologically problematic (Nolen-Hoeksema,
Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). Considering this
broader explanation suggests that “impaired disen-
gagement” due to impaired inhibition (and impaired
attentional control) may promote rumination in a
range of disorders, as ruminative thinking is not lim-
ited to depressive disorders (e.g., social anxiety dis-
order, borderline personality disorder, eating
disorders) (Baer, Peters, Eisenlohr-Moul, Geiger, &
Sauer, 2012; Hofmann, 2007; McEvoy, Watson,
Watkins, & Nathan, 2013).
The outcomes of the current review are also
broadly consistent with ACT (Hayes et al., 1999).
However, these findings do not clearly support the
specific tenets of ACT. Psychological inflexibility
in ACT “entails the rigid dominance of psychological
re-actions over chosen values and contingencies in
guiding action; this often occurs when people fuse
with evaluative and self-descriptive thoughts and
attempt to avoid experiencing unwanted internal
events” (Bond et al., 2011, p. 678). Flexibility entails
higher levels of acceptance and value-based processes
(Hayes et al., 2006) and inflexibility entails lower
levels of such processes, including higher levels of
experiential avoidance (Bond et al., 2011; Hayes
et al., 2006). Support for this account could have been
strengthened if a greater number of studies examined
the relationship between experiential avoidance and
measures that can indicate rigidity. The focus of the
current review upon rigidity and flexibility as com-
monly defined in the psychological, neuropsycholo-
gical, and neurobiological literature meant that
acceptance and value-based processes were not spe-
cifically reviewed and, therefore, it is possible that
relevant supportive research was missed.
Limitations of the current review
It is necessary to consider limitations of the systema-
tic review strategy used here. Although a broad range
of inclusive search terms was used, the authors did not
include nonacademic publications or findings of con-
ference abstracts that were not reported in a peer-
reviewed journal. Therefore, the review is unable to
assess the extent to which publication bias could have
affected the findings reported. Furthermore, the sys-
tematic study selection was carried out by one author,
which could limit objectivity.
The evidence base reported in the current review is
preliminary. Measurement issues (e.g., variable psy-
chometric properties, conflation of neuropsychologi-
cal processes) limit the available literature. Further,
this review is deliberately inclusive of a broad range
of measures with varying time frames; for example,
task-switching paradigms measure processes on the
timescale of seconds, whereas mixing costs measure
on the timescale of minutes, and self-report can mea-
sure various timescales (Meiran, personal communi-
cation). Although this is appropriate to the broad
hypotheses of the review, it is highly recommended
that researchers developing this topic use a more
nuanced approach. It is recommended that researchers
use more than one rigidity paradigm in order to mea-
sure general flexibility rather than task-specific pro-
cesses (Meiran, 2010; Snyder et al., 2015) and chose
paradigms that specifically measure different aspects
of executive functioning. A range of EF can be
impaired in certain client groups, but it is still impor-
tant to establish whether this is the case and not to
conflate impairments arising from different EFs (Sny-
der, 2013; Snyder, Kaiser, Warren, & Heller, 2014).
Dynamic paradigms, such as ecological momentary
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assessment, can be useful as these are able to examine
within-individual adaptations to different contexts
(Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010). It is also noted that
the current review does not examine neurobiological
research and so cannot comment on whether the cog-
nitive processes described arise from common, or dis-
tinct, neural mechanisms (Snyder et al., 2015).
It is important that future studies consider factors
that have been found be related to levels of rigidity in
a number of studies. The majority of studies reviewed
considered the potential impact of age or gender on
switching abilities and some considered the potential
impact of intelligence (Friedman et al., 2006; Schultz
& Searleman, 2002; Tchanturia, Anderluh, et al.,
2004). Apart from the studies on rumination (or with
clients with depression), few studies considered the
impact of mood (Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004; Mar-
ien, Aarts, & Custers, 2012; Meeten & Davey, 2011).
Furthermore, very few studies considered the poten-
tial effect of state anxiety (Eysenck & Derakshan,
2011; Plessow, Fischer, Kirschbaum, & Goschke,
2011). Limited research has investigated whether
switching/inhibition difficulties are a potential causal
risk factor for developing psychopathology or a con-
sequence of psychopathology (Snyder et al., 2015).
Summary of recommendations for
future research
1. Studies that examine whether individuals who
score highly on both rigidity and maintenance
styles are at greater risk of psychopathology
than those who score highly on one or the
other.
2. In addition, studies that examine whether the
interaction between a transdiagnostic process
and rigidity predicts the maintenance and
exacerbation of symptoms of psychopathology
over time, when controlling for psychopathol-
ogy at baseline.
3. Research examining whether the impact of
rigidly applied processes is mediated by goal
conflict, as indicated by our use of a PCT
framework.
4. Further research examining whether rigidity is
a potential causal risk factor for developing
psychopathology or a consequence of
psychopathology.
5. Further research examining how rigidity inter-
acts with internal (e.g., mood) and external
context (e.g., situational demands), as well as
transdiagnostic processes.
Conclusion
With increasing identification of transdiagnostic pro-
cesses, it seems important to consider what mechan-
isms these processes may have in common, in order to
contribute to a parsimonious explanation of psycho-
pathology. The majority of studies indicated that mea-
sures of rigidity/flexibility and maintenance processes
were correlated, co-occurring, or predictive of each
other. Possible explanations for this were considered,
but data were insufficient to draw any definite con-
clusions. Further studies with interaction terms are
required in order to establish whether maintenance
processes in combination with rigidity are particularly
predictive of psychopathology.
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Notes
1. Friedman and Miyake (2004) specifically found a high
correlation between inhibiting responses to distractors
and switch costs.
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2. This definition encompasses emotional rigidity (or emo-
tional inertia): “emotional inertia is the tendency to per-
sist in emotional states, particularly negative states”
(Hollenstein, 2015, p. 310).
3. Emotional (affective) flexibility falls within this defini-
tion. This can describe “cognitive flexibility in the pro-
cessing of emotional material” (Genet & Siemer, 2011,
p. 1) or emotional adaptability with regard to
“qualitative shifts in context and/or goals” (Hollenstein,
2015, p. 311).
4. “Judicious” use is described as providing access to
safety during exposure tasks in the early stages of treat-
ment but subsequently reducing this (Rachman et al.,
2008).
5. Although similar constructs, intolerance of uncertainty
generally refers to difficulty tolerating a future situation
where as intolerance of ambiguity refers to difficulty
tolerating a present moment uncertain situation (Grenier
et al., 2005).
6. Macro-theories aim to explain and model how basic
psychological components relate in people experiencing
psychological distress and those who are not (Barnard,
2004; Barnard et al., 2000). These are broader than
micro-theories, which focus on specific constructs, for
example, the relationship between cognitive processes
and the symptoms of one specific disorder.
7. A goal-relevant process refers to one that is in pursuit of
an individual’s personally important goal; this under-
standing does not preclude that the process employed
may not be the most helpful one to meet that goal. For
example, worry can be engaged in because an individual
believes that it supports their goal to prepare themselves
for a potential threat, but research suggests that repeated
worry is not the most effective strategy to achieve this
(Francis and Dugas, 2004; Ottaviani et al., 2013).
8. The term “negative” is used here to distinguish emotions
(e.g., anger, fear, and depression) from emotions com-
monly described as pleasant and that do not promote the
same tendency toward action (e.g., contentment, equa-
nimity) (Morris et al., 2016; Powers, 2008).
9. The RRS distinguishes between depressive brooding
and reflective pondering (Treynor et al., 2003) and these
studies generally indicate that the brooding subscale is
more strongly associated with switching difficulties
(Koster et al., 2013; Whitmer & Banich, 2007).
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Appendix A
The recommendations in the PRISMA statement for
reporting the flow of information through the differ-
ent phases were followed (Liberati et al., 2009; Moher
et al., 2009). The PRISMA statement includes a 27-
item checklist of items to include in systematic
reviews, which includes items related to all sections
of the review (abstract, introduction, etc.) (Moher
et al., 2009). Of the 27 items recommended, 22 items
were incorporated into the review, as relevant to the
focus of the review. For example, the introduction
described the rationale for the review in the context
of what is already known. The items, or elements of
items, that were not incorporated were generally (with
one exception) excluded because they were not rele-
vant to either the focus or the methodological design
of the review; for example, it was not relevant to
include the details of which interventions were
included, as the review does not examine intervention
studies. Items that were not included were number
five, which pertained to protocol registration, as the
protocol was not registered and is detailed within the
current review rather than elsewhere. Items 15 and 22
were not included as they relate to analyzing risk of
bias across studies and the authors are not aware of
any methods of doing this without first conducting a
meta-analysis. Items 16 and 23 pertain to additional
analyses and were not reported, as it was not appro-
priate to do sensitivity, subgroup, or meta-regression
analyses because the review was not a meta-analysis.
Assessment of study quality
One author conducted all study selection and risk of
bias assessments (unblinded assessments). Although a
number of quality assessment tools are available, the
PRISMA statement cautions against using these (Lib-
erati et al., 2009). Component-based approaches are
recommended (Liberati et al., 2009). The components
focused on in order to assess quality in the current
review were as follows:
 Sample size: Ideally, studies would report results
of an a priori power calculation demonstrating the
study had sufficient sample size. However, very
few studies did and so sample size is judged using
“rules of thumb,” but it is recognized that such
approaches are oversimplifications (Field, 2005).
 Measurement of relevant constructs.
 Design/statistical method, for example, lack of
appropriate controls for factors that had been
demonstrated to affect relationships of interest
and use of randomization.
 Generalizability: Whether the population is
clinical or nonclinical. If multiple appropriate
measures were used to measure the same con-
struct, this was considered to provide additional
generalizability.
Appendix B
Preliminary search terms
Flexibility or rigidity AND. Thinking processes (all-or-
nothing thinking/all adj nothing, black-or-white, black
adj white, dichotomous thinking), selective attention/
attentional bias, attentional avoidance, selective mem-
ory, interpretation reasoning (interpretati* bias), expec-
tation reasoning (reasoning bias and expectancy bias),
emotional reasoning, avoidance behavior, safety beha-
vior, experiential avoidance, pessimistic attributional
style (negative attributional style), intolerance uncer-
tainty, intolerance ambiguity, worry, rumination (rumi-
nati*), impulsivity (impulsiv*), compulsivity
(compulsiv*), and perfectionism (perfectioni*).
Final search terms
The search strategy used was to run an abstract search
for pairs of search terms using a maintenance process
AND a search term related to rigidity or flexibility
(detailed below):
Selective attention/attentional bias, thinking pro-
cesses (all-or-nothing thinking/all adj nothing,
black-or-white, black adj white, and dichotomous
thinking), rumination (ruminati*), worry, perfection-
ism (perfectioni*), intolerance of ambiguity, compul-
sivity (compulsiv*), and impulsivity (impulsiv*).
Rigidity, flexib*, flexibility, cognitive inflexibility,
set-shifting, set-switching, task-shifting, task-
switching, cognitive switching, and perseveration/
perseverative (perseverat*).
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